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As Good as it Gets?

publication date: Jan 1, 1970
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After a stunning rally in equities, commodities and corporate bonds since early March, we are reaching a critical juncture for markets, which have swung from despondency to euphoria since March. Incoming data have moved the investment debate from whether a recovery is imminent to how strong and durable it will prove. I said back in March that 'the free-fall sensation will soon be over and economies will level out, albeit at lower altitude'and that the depression/deflation scenario was misplaced; indeed 10 year inflation expectations in the TIPS market are back at around 2%. The six leading global economies this time around have applied 300% more fiscal stimulus and 500% more much monetary stimulus relative to GDP as occurred in the 1930's, and that was always going to be hugely reflationary. Key factors that turned a hoped-for recovery in 1930 into the disaster of the Great Depression were a sharp hike in interest rates in October 1931 and a decline in the overall price level of 10% per year in 1931 and 1932. 

History isn't going to repeat and indeed the Bernanke Fed is loathe to risk tightening policy before any recovery is self-sustaining as reflected in capacity utilization  climbing to at least 75-80% (ie not before end 2010 if markets don't force their hand). In fact, reflating asset markets was a crucial objective of public policy as much as avoiding CPI deflation, as balance sheets were so dangerously stretched in the US and Europe, and it has proved successful.

Three factors have proved supportive of the ongoing risk asset rally in recent weeks.

  • Firstly, not only is the cycle bottoming earlier than seemed likely back in March, but the recovery is increasingly synchronized on a global scale (with Q3 marking the inflection point for the US and UK, and Europe already modestly rebounding as are the key Asian exporters).
  • Secondly, central banks from the Fed to BOE, far from removing the punch bowl of monetary stimulus, are raiding the drinks cabinet for any leftover monetary hooch they can thrown into the mix to keep the party going. 
  • Thirdly, 10 year government bonds have sold off modestly so far, supported by a natural bid from commercial banks seeking to flatter their capital ratios, and central bank's own buying as well as still declining CPI inflation.

A number of risks loom large in coming months to unnerve complacent investors. 

  • There is a risk that the early stages of recovery prove unexpectedly robust, and precious central bank credibility comes into question, leading to a flight from bonds and indeed the dollar. A full-blooded cyclical recovery may prove far riskier than the consensus anemic affair. Despite most equity indices at their highest since the Lehman debacle, 10 year bond yields remain very modest, and well off the highs seen in the June inflation scare. Would that calm survive a not inconceivable 5% quarterly GDP print for Q1 or Q2 2010?
  • Alternatively, if inventory restocking, particularly in Asia, has already run its course (and inventory to sales ratios are back to long-term averages, having undershot considerably), then it's possible that indicators like the Baltic Freight Index are signalling that a brief economic 'sugar high' is already subsiding and bullish survey data is misleading.
  • China, which has been a cornerstone of the bull case, has flattered to deceive in terms of reported growth figures and reckless lending fuelling commodity, real-estate and stock market speculation. Policy is now tightening by stealth and as that becomes increasingly apparent, and as China seeks to diversify its dollar exposure (possibly via surprise measures to partially open the capital account) it will inject volatility into markets.
  • The US and European (notably Germany, Switzerland and UK) banking sectors remain dangerously leveraged and undercapitalized, and vulnerable to a further round of write-downs from commercial real-estate and private equity loans as we see the refinancing schedule for boom-time loans surge in 2010/11.

A sustained zero interest rate policy prods investors along the risk curve, but also prods consumers to spend. On balance a weaker rather than stronger outcome seems more likely, but leading cyclical indicators suggest the strongest near-term rebound since 1983.Watch the next set of US savings data for a lead on which scenario will play out ie an upside or downside growth surprise. Three secular trends will define the investment landscape for the next decade in the developed markets; they are the rising marginal cost of energy, demographic decline, and ongoing balance sheet deleveraging. All of these are negatives for sustained growth rates. However strong a reflex rebound, once the US stimulus expires, and budget deficits start to narrow, global demand will settle at a new lower level defined by real consumer income growth and productivity. Under those circumstances, the world economy cannot sustainably return to 2003-7 levels of growth, or anything close.